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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
The question presented is whether an alien who has 
spent more than five years in prison for an aggravated felony 
is eligible for a waiver of deportation under former 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(c).  We hold 
that he is not. 
I 
 A native and citizen of Ecuador, Jorge Espinoza 
became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 
1980.  In January 1994, he was served with an order to show 
cause charging him with deportability on the basis of a 
February 1993 New York conviction for selling cocaine.  In 
response, Espinoza filed an application for a waiver of 
deportation under former INA § 212(c).  Prior to his 
deportation hearing, however, Espinoza was paroled into the 
custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
and his proceedings were administratively closed on 
December 5, 1994.  As a result, Espinoza‘s application for § 
212(c) relief was never adjudicated by the agency. 
 After his release from INS custody, Espinoza lived and 
worked in the New York City area until June 2004, when he 
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was arrested again.  On February 22, 2007, Espinoza was 
convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 
841(b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 120 months‘ 
imprisonment.  After his 2007 conviction, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) reopened Espinoza‘s 1994 
deportation proceedings.  In February 2010, DHS served 
Espinoza with an additional charge of deportability based on 
the 2007 conviction, which supplemented the charges that had 
been lodged in 1994. 
 In February 2010, Espinoza‘s first deportation hearing 
was held in York, Pennsylvania.  At Espinoza‘s request, 
Immigration Judge (IJ) Walter Durling postponed the 
proceedings to give Espinoza time to seek an attorney.  In 
April 2010, Judge Durling again postponed the hearing after 
Espinoza requested a list of attorneys to contact.  Although he 
agreed to provide the list, Judge Durling told Espinoza that 
―the list is essentially worthless‖ because ―[n]o organization 
on the list will agree to represent any individual who is still 
serving the terms of imprisonment.‖  Three months later, 
Immigration Judge Jesus Clemente took over the proceedings 
and postponed Espinoza‘s hearing for a third time after 
Espinoza expressed uncertainty as to whether his family had 
retained counsel for him.  Finally, on September 28, 2010, 
Espinoza‘s deportation hearing proceeded, although he still 
had not obtained counsel.  Espinoza told Judge Clemente that 
he had reached out to attorneys on the list the court had 
provided him, but that he had not received any responses.  
Judge Clemente asked Espinoza if he was ready to proceed 
notwithstanding the absence of counsel, and Espinoza agreed 
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to do so.  On May 31, 2011, Judge Durling ordered Espinoza 
removed from the United States to Ecuador.
1
 
In July 2011, Espinoza appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing, inter alia, that: (1) the 
Government had failed to prove that he was not an American 
citizen or national; and (2) he was eligible for a waiver of 
deportability under former INA § 212(c). On August 30, 
2011, the BIA affirmed Judge Durling‘s determination that 
Espinoza was not an American citizen or national, but 
remanded the case so the Immigration Court could consider 
whether Espinoza might be eligible for § 212(c) relief. 
During a September 27, 2011, hearing following 
remand, Judge Durling requested that the Government 
provide Espinoza with a ―short memorandum‖ detailing the 
Government‘s argument for why Espinoza was ineligible for 
§ 212(c) relief and continued the hearing until November 8.  
Before the scheduled hearing was conducted, however, on 
November 4 Judge Durling held that Espinoza was ineligible 
for relief under § 212(c) and entered a second order of 
deportation.
2
 
                                                 
1
 Because Espinoza contended at the September 28, 
2010, hearing that he is a citizen of the United States, Judges 
Clemente and Durling conducted a number of further 
hearings between December 6, 2010, and May 31, 2011, to 
permit Espinoza to obtain evidence to support his claim.  He 
was unable to do so. 
 
2
 Because the Government filed its memorandum on 
November 2, 2011, it is likely that Espinoza did not have time 
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Once again, Espinoza appealed to the BIA, this time 
arguing: (1) he was eligible for § 212(c) relief; (2) his due 
process rights had been violated because he neither received 
the Government‘s § 212(c) memorandum nor had an 
opportunity to present his argument prior to the IJ‘s decision; 
and (3) he had been denied his right to counsel.  In a March 
15, 2012, opinion, the BIA agreed with Judge Durling‘s 
interpretation of relevant precedent addressing § 212(c) 
before ultimately ―find[ing] no error in the Immigration 
Judge‘s legal conclusion that the respondent‘s 2007 
aggravated felony conviction is not subject to waiver under 
section 212(c) under controlling Third Circuit law.‖  App. 17.  
Alternatively, the BIA found that Espinoza was ineligible for 
§ 212(c) relief because, by March 15, 2012, he had served 
five years in prison for his 2007 conviction, dating back to 
February 22, 2007.  Finally, the BIA found Espinoza‘s due 
process and citizenship claims unpersuasive and dismissed his 
appeal, thereby affirming the IJ‘s November 4, 2011, 
deportation order.  Espinoza petitioned for review of the 
BIA‘s August 30, 2011, and March 15, 2012, decisions.3 
 
 
                                                                                                             
to review the memorandum and respond to it before Judge 
Durling‘s November 4 decision. 
 
3
 Espinoza was released from the custody of the United 
States Bureau of Prisons on or about March 15, 2013, and 
was transferred to the custody of United States Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement.  He was deported from the United 
States to Ecuador on or about March 26, 2013. 
 
 7 
 
II 
In support of his petition for review Espinoza claims: 
(1) he is eligible for discretionary relief from deportation 
under former INA § 212(c) and (2) his due process rights 
were violated when he was prevented from presenting his 
case prior to Judge Durling‘s November 4 decision and 
because the IJs failed to ascertain whether he had received the 
required list of attorneys.
4
 
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, which confer appellate jurisdiction 
over decisions of immigration judges in removal 
proceedings.
5
  Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to 
                                                 
 
4
 Espinoza also challenges the BIA‘s conclusion that 
he is not a ―national‖ of the United States within the meaning 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) because he is not a United States 
citizen.  Under the INA, the Attorney General‘s removal 
power is limited to ―deportable aliens.‖  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a).  An alien is defined as ―any person not a citizen or 
national of the United States.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).  
Espinoza argues that even though he is not a citizen of the 
United States, he might still be considered a ―national‖ under 
a ―disjunctive‖ reading of the statutory provision that defines 
the term.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (―The term ‗national of 
the United States‘ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or 
(B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, 
owes permanent allegiance to the United States.‖).  This 
argument is foreclosed by our decision in Salim v. Ashcroft, 
350 F.3d 307, 310 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
 
 
5
 Before the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), ―individuals 
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review final orders of removal based on an alien‘s conviction 
for an aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  
Nevertheless, because Espinoza‘s appeal presents only 
constitutional claims and questions of law relating to the 
BIA‘s final removal order, we have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  See Papageorgiou v. Gonzalez, 413 
F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that ―all aliens, 
including criminal aliens‖ are permitted ―to obtain review of 
constitutional claims and questions of law upon the filing of a 
petition for review with an appropriate court of appeals‖). 
―When, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ‘s decision and 
adds analysis of its own, we review both the IJ‘s and the 
BIA‘s decisions.‖  Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 408, 411 
(3d Cir. 2012) (citing Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (en banc); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 
(3d Cir. 2001)).  We review questions of law de novo.  
Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
                                                                                                             
who were ineligible for admission into the United States and 
were never admitted into the United States were referred to as 
‗excludable,‘ while aliens who had gained admission, but 
later became subject to expulsion from the United States, 
were referred to as ‗deportable.‘  After IIRIRA, aliens who 
were previously referred to as ‗excludable‘ are termed 
‗inadmissible,‘ and the term ‗removal proceedings‘ covers 
proceedings applicable to both inadmissible and deportable 
aliens.  Thus, a reference to an order of removal would 
encompass an order of deportation.‖  Avila-Macias v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F. 3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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III 
A 
 We begin our evaluation of the impact of the five-year 
bar by exploring the evolution of the Attorney General‘s 
authority to grant aliens discretionary relief from deportation.  
Section 212 of the INA of 1952, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182, 
excludes certain classes of aliens from the United States, 
including those convicted of offenses involving moral 
turpitude or illicit narcotics trafficking.  See Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163, 182–87 (1952).  That section was subject to 
a waiver provision, § 212(c), which was codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(c).  The first sentence of § 212(c) provided: ―Aliens 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily 
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of 
deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished 
domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the 
discretion of the Attorney General . . . .‖  66 Stat. at 187, 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed).  Although § 212(c) ―was literally 
applicable only to exclusion proceedings, . . . it . . . has been 
interpreted by the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . to 
authorize any permanent resident alien with ‗a lawful 
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years‘ to apply 
for a discretionary waiver from deportation.‖  INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001) (citing Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. 
Dec. 26, 30 (1976)). 
 A few decades after passing the INA, Congress began 
to narrow the class of permanent resident aliens who may 
apply for discretionary relief under § 212(c).  Of critical 
significance to this appeal, Congress in 1990 amended § 
212(c) to bar discretionary relief to any alien who has ―been 
convicted of an aggravated felony and has served a term of 
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imprisonment of at least 5 years.‖  See Immigration Act of 
1990 § 511(a), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 
(1990) (1990 Amendment).
6
  When Congress enacted the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), it barred § 212(c) relief to those aliens who were 
convicted of a broad set of offenses, including ―aggravated 
felonies, drug convictions, certain weapons or national 
security violations, and multiple convictions involving crimes 
of moral turpitude.‖  Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 556–57 
(3d Cir. 2002); see AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1277–79 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)).  Later 
that same year, Congress passed IIRIRA, which repealed INA 
§ 212(c), and replaced it with a new section, IIRIRA § 240A, 
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  Perez, 294 F.3d at 557.  Under 
§ 240A, the Attorney General does not have discretion to 
cancel removal for anyone previously ―convicted of any 
                                                 
6
 The 1990 Amendment reads: ―Section 212(c) (8 
U.S.C. 1182(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following: ‗The first sentence of this subsection shall not 
apply to an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated 
felony and has served a term of imprisonment of at least 5 
years.‘.‖  This language was subsequently clarified ―by 
striking ‗an aggravated felony and has served‘ and inserting 
‗one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such 
felony or felonies‘.‖  See Miscellaneous and Technical 
Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991 § 
306(a)(10), Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733, 1751 
(1991).  ―This technical change is of no significance to the 
issues presented here either in its text or its effective date . . . 
.‖  Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1519 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citing 105 Stat. at 1759). 
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aggravated felony.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); Perez, 294 F.3d 
at 557.  IIRIRA also contains transitional rules that instruct 
courts not to apply the statute to deportation proceedings 
initiated before the statute‘s effective date of April 1, 1997.  
IIRIRA § 309(c)(1), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 
(1996).
7
  
 In light of this statutory scheme, we consider 
Espinoza‘s criminal and immigration proceedings to 
determine whether he may seek discretionary withholding of 
deportation under § 212(c).  Using all ―traditional tools of 
statutory construction,‖ we first ask ―whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.‖  Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842, 843 n.9 (1984).  ―If Congress has done so, [our] inquiry 
is at an end; [we] ‗must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.‘‖  FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (quoting Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843).   
B 
Espinoza argues that because he was placed into 
deportation proceedings before IIRIRA became law, the 
transitional rules of § 309(c)(1) enable him to seek 
discretionary relief from deportation under former INA 
                                                 
7
 IIRIRA § 309(c)(1) states: ―[I]n the case of an alien 
who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of the title 
III-A effective date—(A) the amendments made by this 
subtitle shall not apply, and (B) the proceedings (including 
judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted 
without regard to such amendments.‖ 
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§ 212(c).  We need not address this argument because the 
1990 Amendment bars Espinoza from seeking § 212(c) relief 
irrespective of IIRIRA.  
At the time Espinoza filed his first application for § 
212(c) relief in 1994, Congress had already amended the 
statute in 1990 to bar discretionary relief to those convicted of 
an ―aggravated felony‖ who had served a term of 
imprisonment of at least five years.  The language of the 1990 
Amendment is unequivocal: ―The first sentence of [§ 212(c)] 
shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony and has served a term of imprisonment of 
at least 5 years.‖  104 Stat. at 5052 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As we have stated, ―§ 212(c) plainly bars 
discretionary relief to aliens who have served at least five 
years‘ imprisonment for one or more ‗aggravated felonies.‘‖  
Scheidemann, 83 F.3d at 1518.  Where, as here, the initial § 
212(c) application was filed after 1990, the only date that 
matters is when the petitioner began serving his criminal 
sentence.  See id. at 1526 (―If an alien has served at least five 
years‘ imprisonment for a felony conviction, as petitioner 
here has, the only limitations on the applicability of the § 
212(c) bar are two: (1) that the application for relief must 
have been submitted after the date of the bar‘s enactment, and 
(2) that the conviction must have been for an ‗aggravated 
felony‘ as defined in the Act.‖). 
Espinoza concedes that his conviction for conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine constitutes an 
aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(B).  By the time the BIA issued its final order of 
deportation on March 15, 2012, Espinoza had served more 
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than five years for his 2007 conviction and thus, as the BIA 
correctly held, he was ineligible for § 212(c) relief.
8
 
Espinoza‘s sole rejoinder is that equity demands that 
he be relieved from the operation of the statute as written.  He 
argues that ―[b]ecause he had not served five years‘ 
imprisonment for an aggravated felony prior to his 
[September 1994] application [for § 212(c) relief], his 
application should not have been denied under the five-year 
bar.‖  Espinoza Br. 25.  Espinoza cites our decision in 
Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated 
on other grounds by Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 
(2011), as support for the proposition that he was entitled to 
seek § 212(c) relief as a matter of equity.  
In Caroleo, the BIA issued a final order of removal 
denying § 212(c) relief based on an arguably incorrect 
interpretation of the Supreme Court‘s holding in St. Cyr.  
Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 160–61.  At the time of the order, 
Caroleo had not yet served five years in prison for his 
underlying aggravated felony conviction.  Id. at 160.  A few 
years later, he filed a special motion with the BIA, again 
seeking § 212(c) relief, and again arguing that he deserved 
relief under St. Cyr.  Id. at 161.  By this point, however, 
Caroleo had served more than eight years in prison.  Id.  He 
argued that we should, nunc pro tunc, consider his § 212(c) 
application retroactive to April 2001—the time when he first 
raised the St. Cyr issue before the IJ and BIA and before he 
had served five years in prison.  Id. at 162.  Because we held 
                                                 
8
 Because Espinoza is ineligible for § 212(c) relief due 
to the five-year bar, we do not reach the BIA‘s alternative 
holding that Espinoza was also ineligible under IIRIRA 
§ 240A. 
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that Caroleo was ineligible for § 212(c) relief on grounds 
unrelated to his St. Cyr argument, we did not determine 
whether he could seek § 212(c) relief.  Id. at 162–63.  
Nevertheless, we stated: 
Were we to reach the [St. Cyr issue], we would 
hold that Caroleo should be permitted, on 
equitable grounds, to apply for § 212(c) relief 
despite having now served more than five years 
in prison . . . .  
Id. at 162.  Espinoza argues that this dictum applies to his 
petition for review.  We disagree.   
 As we have noted, the 1990 Amendment 
unambiguously states that an aggravated felon who has 
served more than five years for his crime is ineligible for 
§ 212(c) relief.  Scheidemann, 83 F.3d at 1518; see also 
Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38, 47 (1st Cir. 
2005) (―[T]he language of § 212(c) seems to us utterly 
clear—the relief sought simply does not exist for an 
aggravated felon who has served five years of his felony 
term.‖).  A court may not award equitable relief in 
contravention of the expressed intent of Congress.  See INS v. 
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883–85 (1988) (―[I]t is well 
established that ‗[c]ourts of equity can no more disregard 
statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than 
can courts of law,‘‖ id. at 883 (quoting Hedges v. Dixon 
Cnty., 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (alteration in original)).  
Because Espinoza has now spent more than five years in 
prison for an aggravated felony, he is statutorily precluded 
from seeking relief under § 212(c).   
 15 
 
In addition, the facts of Caroleo are readily 
distinguishable from the facts of Espinoza‘s case.  There, 
Caroleo had not yet served five years in prison at the time the 
BIA issued its arguably erroneous final order of removal.
9
  
Caroleo, 476 F.3d at 162.  For Espinoza, however, the five-
year period lapsed during the pendency of the administrative 
proceedings.  By the time the BIA issued its final order of 
deportation on March 15, 2012, Espinoza had served more 
than five years in prison following his February 22, 2007, 
aggravated felony conviction.  Unlike in Caroleo, where the 
BIA‘s decision to deny § 212(c) relief was arguably based on 
legal error alone, the BIA denied Espinoza‘s § 212(c) claim 
                                                 
9
 At least one of our sister courts has held that nunc 
pro tunc relief should be granted to an alien who became 
statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief based on the five-year 
bar subsequent to a legally erroneous denial of the alien‘s 
original application.  See Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 304, 
312 (2d Cir. 2004).  But see Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 
488 F.3d 672, 679 (5th Cir. 2007) (―[T]his court‘s equitable 
nunc pro tunc authority cannot be used to fix the type of error 
that occurred when the BIA erroneously denied Romero‘s 
initial application for a § 212(c) waiver.‖); Pereira, 417 F.3d 
at 47 (―declin[ing] the [Second Circuit‘s] invitation‖ in 
Edwards because ―the language of § 212(c) seems to us 
utterly clear—the relief sought simply does not exist for an 
aggravated felon who has served five years of his felony 
term‖).  The Second Circuit was careful to note, however, that 
it ―express[ed] no views on whether an award of nunc pro 
tunc relief would be similarly warranted where the alien 
accrued more than five years imprisonment during the 
pendency of the administrative appeals.‖  Edwards, 393 F.3d 
at 312 n.18 (emphasis added). 
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on two independent grounds: (1) a rejection of his § 212(c) 
argument based on IIRIRA and (2) the five-year bar.  Even if 
we assume, arguendo, that the BIA erred in its interpretation 
of how IIRIRA affected Espinoza‘s § 212(c) claim, the five-
year bar still prevented the BIA from granting Espinoza § 
212(c) relief.  Thus, Caroleo is inapposite.  Simply put, we 
hold that the BIA correctly held that Espinoza was ineligible 
to seek § 212(c) relief because he had served more than five 
years for an aggravated felony by the time the BIA affirmed 
the IJ‘s deportation order. 
IV 
 Espinoza also argues that he suffered two due process 
violations during the course of his deportation proceedings.  
We disagree. 
 First, Espinoza contends that we should remand the 
case because the IJs failed to comply with regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General to protect his right to 
counsel.  Section 1240.10(a)(2)-(3) of Title 8 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations directs that ―‗[i]n a removal proceeding, 
the immigration judge shall‘ ‗[a]dvise the respondent of the 
availability of free legal services provided by organizations 
and attorneys . . . located in the district where the removal 
hearing is being held‘ and shall ‗[a]scertain that the 
respondent has received a list of such programs[.]‘‖  Leslie v. 
Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3)) (alterations in original).  A review 
of the record indicates that the IJs satisfied these 
requirements. 
  A few minutes into the April 2010 hearing, Espinoza 
requested a list of attorneys to contact and Judge Durling 
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agreed to send Espinoza the list.  The IJs then postponed 
Espinoza‘s hearing twice more—for a total of three 
postponements—thereby giving Espinoza more than five 
months to secure counsel.  At the start of Espinoza‘s fourth 
hearing, the following exchange occurred: 
[IJ Clemente:] Now, sir, I gave you time to get 
an attorney.  Were you able to get an attorney? 
[Espinoza:]  I wrote letters to the attorneys that 
you guys provided me with, the list.  And I 
haven‘t received anything in response yet. . . . 
App. 147–48 (emphasis added).  The record indicates that the 
IJs advised Espinoza of the availability of free legal services 
and provided him with a list of such programs in compliance 
with 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2)-(3). 
 Espinoza‘s claim that Judge Durling denied him due 
process by rendering a decision on the § 212(c) issue on 
November 4 without first giving Espinoza the opportunity to 
present his arguments on November 8 is also unavailing.  
―Where an alien claims a denial of due process because he 
was prevented from making his case to the BIA or the IJ, he 
must show (1) that he was ‗prevented from reasonably 
presenting his case‘ and (2) that ‗substantial prejudice‘ 
resulted.‖  Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155 (quoting Khan v. Att’y 
Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation 
marks, citation, and footnote omitted).  Espinoza posits that 
―[h]ad [he] been given the opportunity to respond to the 
government‘s position, the IJ might well have . . . declined to 
order [his] removal.‖  Espinoza Br. 32.  But Espinoza fails to 
cite any evidence that suggests the outcome would have been 
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different had the IJ waited until after November 8 to issue his 
legal ruling. 
When the BIA remanded Espinoza‘s case to Judge 
Durling on August 30, 2011, it explicitly noted that it was 
doing so because ―recent decisions from the Second, Fifth, 
and Ninth Circuits support the conclusion that the respondent 
is not barred from obtaining 212(c) relief as a result of his 
2007 conviction.‖  App. 12 (citing Pascua v. Holder, 641 
F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 2011); Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 
F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2010); Garcia-Padron v. Holder, 558 F.3d 
196 (2d Cir. 2009)).  Then, during the hearing following 
remand, Judge Durling and the Government attorney engaged 
in an extended colloquy about relevant caselaw.  App. 69–73.  
When the Government attorney attempted to argue that 
Espinoza was precluded from § 212(c) relief based on Third 
Circuit precedent, Judge Durling pushed back based on the 
caselaw the BIA cited in its remand order.  App. 71 
(―Actually, the circuit courts out there . . . [p]ermit post-
IIRIRA convictions if it‘s subject to 212(c). . . .  So his 2007 
federal drug trafficking offense, in those circuits they would 
say he is eligible for 212(c) for that.‖). 
In the end, Judge Durling was persuaded by the 
Government‘s argument that relevant Third Circuit precedent 
precluded Espinoza from seeking § 212(c) relief.  Though he 
ultimately ruled against Espinoza, Judge Durling exhibited a 
deft familiarity with the relevant caselaw and, in fact, noted 
the same argument during the hearing that Espinoza presented 
in his January 25, 2012, letter to the BIA explaining his 
grounds for appeal.  Compare App. 69–73, with App. 45–47.  
The BIA also considered these arguments, which it had 
already cited in its previous remand order, and, after 
reviewing Judge Durling‘s decision de novo, issued its own 
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opinion rejecting them.  Even now, Espinoza‘s § 212(c) 
arguments remain fundamentally unchanged from what Judge 
Durling posited during the remand hearing.  The proceedings 
did not require additional factfinding and turned on a discrete 
question of law that Judge Durling understood and carefully 
considered.  Judge Durling acknowledged Espinoza‘s best 
arguments during the September 27, 2011, hearing and 
Espinoza was able to present those arguments fully, first to 
the BIA and now to this Court.  Therefore, Espinoza suffered 
no prejudice and was not deprived of due process. 
V 
 Because Espinoza has served more than five years in 
prison for an aggravated felony, he may not seek 
discretionary relief from deportation under INA § 212(c).  
Furthermore, he suffered no due process violations during the 
pendency of his administrative proceedings.  Therefore, we 
will affirm the BIA‘s decision ordering Espinoza deported 
from the United States.
10
 
                                                 
10
 Mr. Espinoza was represented pro bono by Gregory 
F. Laufer.  The Court is grateful for Mr. Laufer‘s work on this 
case, which was consistent with the highest standards of the 
Third Circuit Bar.   
